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Abstract In this essay I examine G. A. Cohen’s notion of deep bullshit; I provide
a counterexample to the often-implicit belief that deep bullshit is always bad, and
unphilosophical. Section 1’s outline of deep bullshit includes an important criterion
for being deep bullshit which philosophers often leave implicit; deep bullshit is a
bad and undesirable phenomenon that we should root out. Section 2 examines
whether the kōans of Chan Buddhists were deep bullshit. In this section I argue
they were; not only do they fit all modern definitions of deep bullshit, the Chan
teachers were intentional deep bullshitters. In section 3 I argue we should not see
the deep bullshit of Chan Buddhism as bad and un-philosophical; in Chan, through
deep bullshit came philosophical inquiry. Section 4 responds to the Cohenian po-
sition, which holds any text which is “suggestive” is not deep bullshit; a Cohenian
could claim Chan’s kōans are suggestive, and so are not deep bullshit. I criticise
this position by arguing that since philosophers of deep bullshit categorise Sokal’s
spoof article as deep bullshit, they must also categorise Chan kōans as deep bull-
shit. In section 5 I argue most allegations of deep bullshit are likely to be epistemic
trespass. In section 6 I make recommendations for how to avoid trespassing deep
bullshit allegations in future.
1 Deep Bullshit
The philosophical discussion of bullshit originates in Harry Frankfurt’s work. Frank-
furt identified Bullshit as a form of deceit, which was distinct from lying. Upon his
account, when one lies one has the intention to convince the listener of a proposition
which is not true, whereas when one bullshits one has no interest in the truth whatso-
ever.1
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1. Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 52-4.
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Cohen2 mainly agreed with Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit but thought he could
identify bullshit of a different kind. Whereas Frankfurt’s bullshit was identifiable from
the intentions of the speaker, Cohen’s bullshit is identifiable from the speakers’ expres-
sions themselves. Cohen called his new category “deep bullshit”; he believed it was
especially prevalent in academia.
Cohen argued a condition for being deep bullshit is that a statement has “unclari-
fiable unclarity”; the statement is obscure and cannot be unobscured. Cohen argued
that for unclear statements “adding or subtracting (if it has one) a negation sign from
a text makes no difference to its level of plausibility’‘.3 If we could put a negation sign
on Heidegger’s definition of dasein, or Russell’s definition of a set, and leave it equally
plausible, then it would be unclear. If the statement can’t be clarified to a sufficient
level to change the symmetry of plausibility in negation, then it is deep bullshit. Be-
low I call this the negation condition for deep bullshit; Cohen saw it as a sufficient
condition.
Cappelen and Dever also gave an account of deep bullshit; they argued deep bull-
shit is “nonsense or gibberish”; the expression has no meaning, although it may ap-
pear to.4 Non-exhaustive examples may include instances of one’s words referring to
thingswhich don’t exist, or one’s expressions failing to satisfy the necessary conditions
for meaningfulness (which they decline to give).5
Afinal, very important but often implicit, aspect of all bullshit is that it’s bad. Frank-
furt originally wanted to explore a phrase already used in everyday language, which
we take as a bad quality of a statement, and investigate what this bad quality is. He
claimed we use the word “bullshit” to describe the statements of bullshiĴing speak-
ers because we find their statements, like excrement, “so repulsive”.6 Cohen wrote of
how allegations of bullshit serve to “stigmatize” a text, and urged us to “conduct a
struggle against” bullshit in the academy.7 This is also true of Cappelen and Dever’s
recent chapter on bullshit, they call for a crusade to “root (deep bullshit) out”.8 The
use of these words about bullshit are illuminating because of how they look down on
statements which they classify as (deep) bullshit.
Unlike with Frankfurt’s bullshit, it is possible to deep bullshit unintentionally. The
unintentional deep bullshiĴer is probably gullible, but they are not morally blame-
worthy. It is the charlatan who, through “speak(ing) meaninglessly on purpose”, in-
tends to “deceive” by presenting their expressions as if they havemeaning.9 This inten-
2. Gerald Allan Cohen, “Deeper Into Bullshit”, in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from
Harry Frankfurt, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, MassachusseĴs: The MIT Press, 2011).
3. Gerald Allan Cohen, “Deeper Into Bullshit”, 333.
4. Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, Bad Language (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), 60.
5. Ibid, 63-4, 67-9.
6. Frankfurt, On Bullshit, 43-4.
7. Cohen, “Deeper Into Bullshit”, 335.
8. Cap.& Dev., Bad Language, 65.
9. Ibid, 64-5; Alan D. Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Ab-
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tional deception, on Cappelen and Dever’s view, gives the charlatan a higher amount
of reprehensibility than the unintentional deep bullshiĴer.
2 Deep Bullshit in Kōans
Chan Buddhism is a Chinese school of Buddhism. Kōans emerged in Chan from the
11th century. A kōan is a very concise story which is meant to help the reader achieve
progress in their spiritual practice. Kōans commonly involved a question and answer
between a student and a teacher, with the teacher’s response expressing a great truth.
In this section I argue many kōans are deep bullshit.
Cohen’s negation condition for deep bullshit is especially true of a certain type of
kōan. In certain kōans the student asks the teacher “what is Buddha?”. In kōans 30, 33,
and 34 of a single volume collection of kōans the teachers respond: “the very mind is
Buddha”, “nomind, no Buddha”, and “mind is not Buddha”.10 The contradiction here
is evident, but at no point in this collection of kōans is it suggested that the logically
contradictory answers are incompatible; Chan holds the negation of one answer to
“what is Buddha?” to be equally as plausible as the non-negated form. Therefore, it
seems clear that Chan kōans fit Cohen’s unclarifiable unclarity sufficient condition, and
a Cohenian would categorise Chan kōans as deep bullshit.11
Would Cappelen and Dever categorise the “What is Buddha?” kōans as deep bull-
shit? It is difficult to speak on their behalf given their refusal to give necessary or
sufficient conditions. But there are certainly examples which interpreters hold to be
nonsense, or gibberish. For example, in another “what is Buddha?” kōan the teacher re-
sponds “Masagin! (Three pounds of flax!)”.12 Certainly there is a metaphorical element
to the expression here, but Yamada’s commentary on the case stresses that a central
part of any interpretation should focus on the sound, the gibberish noise, with nothing
else.13 You could substituteMasagin for “whack (hiĴing the table)!” or just “Ma!”, but
the response should involve a nonsense element.
use of Science (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), 5. Sokal and Bricmont coined “charlatan” for the
intentional bullshiĴer; Sokal is introduced in §4.
10. Yamada Kōun, The Gateless Gate: the Classic Book of Zen Koans, 2nd ed. (Somerville, MA, USA:
Wisdom Publications, 2015), 148, 161, 165.
11. There are aĴempts to clarify Chan Buddhist metaphysics. Although, even on these readings, many
key Chan Buddhist concepts behind kōans such as “transcending duality” remain “not, of course, en-
tirely clear’‘. Graham Priest, “Enlightenment’‘, in The Fifth Corner of Four: an Essay on Buddhist Meta-
physics and the Catuskoti, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 141. See chapter 9 of this work for
as clear a reading of Chan metaphysics of enlightenment as is likely possible. For any reader still con-
vinced that all kōans can be clarified, this essay can be read as saying even if it were the case that kōans
were unclarifiable, it would not follow that they were something to be rooted out. I am grateful to an
anonymous peer reviewer for this clarification.
12. Yamada, The Gateless Gate, 89.
13. Ibid, 90.
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Reflective readers will already be unhappy with Cohen, and Cappelen and Dever’s
accounts of deep bullshit. Cohen’s definition itself is unclear; what does it mean to
be “plausible”? This is quite a dubious notion for a number of reasons.14 Cappelen
and Dever’s account is also quite underdeveloped. For instance, when talking about
French psycho-analyst and philosopher Jacques Lacan, Cappelen and Dever are very
confident in claiming “much of what Lacan said was meaningless”, but they decline to
give necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement to have meaning.15
I’m sure there are responses to the above criticisms, but to an extent this doesn’t
maĴer. “Poking fun” and deprecation of peoples’ life works is very common in the
Chan tradition, sometimes it almost seems as if the higher the mockery, the higher the
praise.16 For example, Bodhidharma (the monk who brought Buddhism to China) is
called a “broken toothed barbarian”, but Mumon, the compiler of this work, insists
that what initially sounds insulting (not because of any mistranslation) has “friendly
overtones”.17 In this sense, when one says that Chan philosophy is “bullshit” it sounds
like one is affirming, even grasping the true message, of the tradition.
I believe the Chan Buddhists were intentional deep bullshiĴers. To me, despite the
weaknesses of Cappelen and Dever’s account, deep bullshit as some sort of profound-
sounding gibberish is still intuitive. For example, I would be more than happy to
refer to something that comes from a New Age Bullshit generator as deep bullshit.18
In Froese’s interpretation of Chan, she argues for an interpretation to the effect that
they intentionally created their own deep bullshit.19 There is a story of a Chan teacher
who speaks to a congregation of the “great mystery”, claiming most do not appreciate
its “application”. Yang Shan, a student, asks for clarification on these words, and is
promptly kicked in the face by the monastery’s abbot, at which the teacher laughs.20
Froese takes this story as the teacher baiting the students into seeking intellectual pur-
suit through “grandiosewords”; thewords used are intentionally profound-sounding,
but are in fact deep bullshit.
3 The Meaning of the Gibberish
Cohen wanted to formulate deep bullshit independently from intentions, but, as in the
case of charlatans, if the author aims at deep bullshit it is likely that they succeed. In
14. I am indebted to comments fromWalter Pedriali in an email exchange for this point.
15. Cap.& Dev., Bad Language, 70-1.
16. Katrin Froese, Why Can’t Philosophers Laugh? (Cham, Swiĵerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017),
174.
17. Yamada, The Gateless Gate, 194-7.
18. See: hĴps://sebpearce.com/bullshit/
19. Froese Why Can’t Philosophers Laugh?, 178.
20. Tao-Yuan and SohakuOgata, The Transmission of the Lamp: EarlyMasters (Wolfeboro, NH: Long-
wood Academic, 1990), 300.
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my view, the Chan Buddhists certainly intended for their words to be deep bullshit.
But I wouldn’t call the Chan teachers charlatans, because I don’t see their discourse as
bad and un-philosophical. I justify this through answering why Yang Shan is kicked.
On the one hand, Yang Shan is refused clarification; the language the Chan teachers
are using embraces contradiction and unclarity as a way to expose what they believe is
the inevitable paradox and bullshit in all language; their statements draw aĴention to
a universal unclarity they think is present in language.21 On the other hand, the kick
is Yang Shan’s clarification; you will find what the teacher means outside of language,
through experience of day to day sensations like the pain of a kick in the face.
To me, these interpretations of the Chan teachers gives them a philosophical po-
sition. Chan has a position on the nature of all language; it is all gibberish. Phrases
like “the sound of one hand clapping” serve to illustrate this but are no more gibberish
than the rest of language. The Pyrhonnian sceptics held a similarly unoptimistic pos-
ition about the nature of all justification; if the Pyrhonnians’ position doesn’t exclude
them from being philosophers, it seems difficult to non-chauvinistically exclude Chan
Buddhism for their comparable positions.
Furthermore, Chan takes a normative position on the best course of action to accu-
mulate virtue; it is awareness of everyday experience. They thought that the contra-
diction in all statements entailed that we should focus on what is immediately aware
to us in perception. Their normative ethics is like any other in philosophy. They use
reasoning to find the best course of action; the only difference is that with their use of
logic they also reject logic as we know it.
Each kōan’s idiosyncratic response, like a thought experiment, functions as a philo-
sophical tool; it serves to illustrate Chan’s broad theses about truth. The “what is
Buddha?” kōans’ meaning is that there is no meaning, or at least no non-contradictory
meaning; in this sense, there is meaning to the gibberish. There is just “whack!” The
kōan functions as a pedagogical tool to frustrate, and then gradually remove aĴach-
ment to language. Through tying our brain into knots with its deliberate nonsense, the
kōan’s message is to highlight the unsatisfactoriness of language as a tool for seeking
happiness.22 This is certainly obscure, unclear, and even deep bullshit, but should we
root it out? Is it not worthy of the name philosophy?
We might complain that any account of meaning which includes gibberish is un-
satisfactory, but do we already have sufficient handle on the notion of meaningfulness
to exclude gibberish? Without assuming that the methodology that has been useful
to analytic philosophers for their own purposes and discussions for the last 100 or so
years is superior and philosophy-defining, can we justifiably say that the Chan ap-
proach is bad and unphilosophical?
Some opponents to my view might admit that the Chan teachers were not being
21. Froese, Why Can’t Philosophers Laugh?, 22, 182-3.
22. Ibid, 18.; Useful quote from this page: “Sense becomes nonsense; nonsense becomes sense”.
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unphilosophical with their kōans and more general methods of inquiry, but the op-
ponents would maintain the claim that what the Chan teachers were doing was bad.
Indeed, claiming the Chan inquiry was good philosophy is a far stronger claim than
Chanphilosophywas philosophical in any sense, and the two are separable. Onemight
admit that theChan Buddhists aimed to answer similar questions to good philosophers
but used a poor methodology to do so. This section has made a very tentative aĴempt
at defending both claims. I hope that this section provides liĴle doubt that the Chan
Buddhists were doing philosophy in some form; they made similar claims to others
whom we call philosophers. A much longer essay would be needed to indisputably
defend Chan inquiry as good philosophy. Certainly, if I am correct that there is good
Cohenian bullshit, then further work needs to be done to distinguish the good from
the bad.
4 Productive Suggestiveness is not an Anti-necessary
Condition
One might argue that, despite the arguments in Section 2, Chan kōans are not deep
bullshit. Cohen appealed to “suggestiveness” to classify “good poetry” that is still
unclear/gibberish, as not deep bullshit. Cohen wanted to formulate his deep bullshit
independently from the speaker’s intentions, preventing him from arguing that poetry
is not deep bullshit because it is designated aspoetry by the speaker. Instead, he argued
an unclarifiable text could be “valuable”, i.e. not deep bullshit which is bad, “because
of its suggestiveness”. Through the multiple interpretations that we can draw from
the text it can “stimulate thought” to give us valuable insights.23
Cohen himself, in a reference, gave a very brief suggestion about what his own
views might have been on Chan Buddhism. He allows “the unclarifiable may be
productively suggestive” but does not agree with Yu-Lan’s claim that Chinese philo-
sophy’s common lack of “articulateness” (presumably, close enough to be a synonym
for clarity forCohen’s use) is compensated for byChinese philosophy’s “almost bound-
less” suggestiveness.24
But let’s move past Cohen’s personal biases and assume that Chan Buddhism is
“productively suggestive” (as said in section 3, to show that Chan Buddhism is good
philosophy would need a much longer essay). In the context of philosophy, product-
ive suggestiveness is the ability of a text to “stimulate thought” in a manner which
is productive in helping us reach valuable philosophical insights. Cohen held pro-
ductive suggestiveness as an anti-necessary condition (the negation of the condition
23. Cohen, “Deeper Into Bullshit”, 333-4.
24. Ibid, 334.; Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Derek Bodde (London: Mac-
millan, 1960), 12.
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is necessary) for being deep bullshit that overrode his unclarifiable unclarity sufficient
condition; if an unclarifiable text is productively suggestive, then it is not deep bullshit.
I would agree with Cohen that the productive suggestiveness of Chan kōans, as-
suming that they are productively suggestive, is what makes them philosophically
valuable. However, I would maintain that Chan kōans are often deep bullshit; I just
wouldn’t condemn them, and label them as non-philosophy because of this. We can
tell Chan kōans are deep bullshit because Froese’s interpretation of the Yang Shan kick-
ing case tells us the Chan Buddhists aimed at deep bullshit.25 Sokal made a spoof art-
icle which Cohen accepted as “deliberate bullshit”; the piecewas “self-condemning” in
that itwas presented as non-deep bullshit at first, andwhen it fooled people as sincere it
was supposed to illustrate a point about the nature of philosophical inquiry (namely,
that lots of philosophy conducted on the continent is deep bullshit).26 Just as with
Sokal, Chan Buddhists aimed to tell us something about the nature of philosophical
inquiry through producing a piece of self-condemning philosophy; the meaning was
that the statements they were making inevitably included some deep bullshit, which
makes a broader point about philosophical inquiry. What this shows is that, even with
their productive suggestiveness, Chan Buddhist kōans are still deep bullshit, because
they intentionally embrace deep bullshit just like Sokal’s article. It is also true that, like
Sokal’s article, it is perfectly possible for the kōans to be insightful despite being deep
bullshit.
A Cohenian might complain that the response in the previous paragraph ignores
Cohen’s formulation of deep bullshit as independent from “intentional encasement”
i.e. the intentions of the speaker.27 Cohen admiĴed Sokal’s article was deep bullshit,
but not because of Sokal’s intention to create deep bullshit. There were some other
satisfied conditions which made Sokal’s article deep bullshit, including the article’s
unclarifiable unclarity. That Sokal was open about his intent to create deep bullshit is
helpful in identifying that the article is deep bullshit, but the intent is not what makes
the article deep bullshit.
To me this doesn’t seem right; the reason Sokal and Cohen saw Sokal’s article
as “really” deep bullshit is because of Sokal’s devious intention to create deep bull-
shit. But, even if it is true Sokal’s article was deep bullshit because of an intention-
independent sufficient condition for deep bullshit being satisfied, I would challenge
objectors to identify a condition which can be found in Sokal’s article that classifies it
as deep bullshit which is not present in the teacher’s statement in the Yang Shan case.
We might claim Sokal’s article was deep bullshit because it was obscure, unclear, and
25. This doesn’t make the kōans deep bullshit on the accounts of deep bullshit we are working with.
However, this does provide a good additional indicator; if the speaker aimed at deep bullshit, and upon
analysis their statements seem to be a profound-sounding nonsense, then their statements are most
likely deep bullshit. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
26. Alan D. Sokal, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of
Quantum Gravity’‘, Social Text, no. 46/47 (1996): , 217-252, hĴps://doi.org/10.2307/466856.
27. Cohen, “Deeper Into Bullshit”, 7.
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unverifiable; these are all true in the Yang Shan case.
Cohen’s classification of Sokal’s article as the archetype of that which aims to be
deep bullshit and succeeds, and the similarity of productively suggestive argument-
ation from Sokal’s intentional deep bullshit to Chan’s intentional deep bullshit is no-
ticeable.28 Therefore, a Cohenian claim that the productive suggestiveness of Chan
excludes it from being deep bullshit cannot work; assuming Chan is productively sug-
gestive, it is so in the same way as Sokal’s article (which Cohen is happy to call deep
bullshit).
In the current and previous sections, my goal has been to question the narrative that
deep bullshit is not always negative with examples from Chan Buddhist philosophy.
Another aim was to suggest that nonsense might have some meaning, but this is a far
more ambitious aim that I do not claim to have proven.
In the following sections, I want to reflect on why deep bullshit allegations have
arisen.29 In section 5, I analyse why deep bullshit allegations emerge; I argue that
epistemic trespass is often the most likely explanation for deep bullshit allegations. In
section 6, I make some recommendations for avoiding false, trespassing, deep bullshit
allegations.
5 The Best Explanation for Allegations of Deep Bull-
shit is Epistemic Trespass
Epistemic trespass occurs when an expert has competence to make judgements in one
field, but they speak about another field where they lack competence. With so-called
public intellectuals, it is easy to think of cases of this. Richard Dawkins is one ex-
ample. Dawkins is certainly an expert on evolutionary biology, but he has also pub-
lished books and given talks about religion. Philosophers of religion, of all beliefs
about the existence of God(s), have accused Dawkins of being very uncharitable to his
opponents and ignoring the genuine issues.30 Despite his lack of expertise in this do-
main, Dawkins speaks with as much confidence as he would if he were talking about
evolutionary biology.
Why do deep bullshit allegations emerge? For most instances, I think there are two
explanations that are most plausible:
28. Cap.& Dev. Bad Language, 64. Cappelen and Dever call Sokal’s work “intentional gibberish” so
theymay not be so susceptible here Although, my reading of Cappelen andDever would interpret them
as being happy with calling Sokal’s spoof deep bullshit.
29. Katherine Hawley, “Identity and Indiscernibility’‘, Mind 118, no. 469 (January 2009): , 101-119,
hĴps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn153. This is strongly influenced by Katherine Hawley’s change of dir-
ection in the final section of her paper on the Identity of Indiscernibles.
30. Nathan Ballantyne, “Epistemic Trespassing’‘, Mind 128, no. 510 (December 2018): , 367, ht-
tps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzx042.
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1. The allegation is correct. The accused is producing deep bullshit; possibly inten-
tionally. 31
2. The allegation is incorrect. The accused is not producing deep bullshit. The ac-
cuser has commiĴed epistemic trespass.
There are other plausible explanations. Perhaps the accuser is incorrect but there
is no trespass, maybe they just want to discredit their dialectical opponent and are
commiĴing (Frankfurt’s) bullshit, but I imagine these are relatively rare cases.
I don’t want to make a systematic survey of all allegations of deep bullshit, and
claim most of them are instances of epistemic trespass. Instead, I want to suggest that
in most situations the allegation is best explained by epistemic trespass, rather than
genuine deep bullshit. But, to illustrate the point, Sokal and Bricmont’s high profile
allegations against Lacan are useful.32 Lacanwas a prolific French psycho-analyst, who
has been highly influential for continental philosophy.33 Sokal and Bricmont argued
Lacan created deep bullshit; they took particular issue with his claims which make use
of mathematical language. For instance, they expressed disdain for Lacan’s equating
“the erectile organ. . . to the
√−1 ’‘.34
Perhaps 1. is true. Lacan was competent enough to achieve highly in academia, so
he and his most intelligent successors probably also figured out that this is nonsense.
They have gone along with the bullshit; they are knowing charlatans. The charlatans
have conned philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, Marxists, and those in many
other fields. They have also fooled the students who study under them and who pay
lots of money to be taught by them (although, not if they are being taught at a public
French university).
Option 1. would be the most likely explanation if:
(i) The accuser(s) are experts in the field that they are accusing someone in.
(ii) The accused are talking about a domain outside of their own expertise, making
the accused more likely to be trespassing.
31. Despite my non-pejorative use of “deep bullshit” to refer to discussions in Chan philosophy above,
I have not seen any other deep bullshit aĴributions that are non-accusatory, and non-pejorative.
32. Sokal and Bricmont don’t use the phrase “deep bullshit”, but Cappelen and Dever, and Cohen,
took them as showing that many “French thinkers” wrote deep bullshit.
33. Adrian Johnston “Jacques Lacan” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta
(2018).
34. Sokal & Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense, 27.; Jacques Lacan, in Ecrits: a Selection., trans. Alan
Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 292-325.; For a defence of Lacan’s statement see Arkady
Plotnitsky, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical Tought, and the ”Two
Cultures” (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005). Arkady Plotnitsky, “On Lacan and
Mathematics’‘, Oeuvres & Critiques XXXIV 2 (2009): , 143-162.
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(iii) There is a consensus, within the field that the accused’s work is part of, that the
accused’s work is deep bullshit.
None of these are the case for Sokal andBricmont’s allegations against Lacan’s state-
ments that Sokal and Bricmont quote.35
i. does not apply. Sokal and Bricmont seemed to be aware they were writing about
thinkers whom they were not experts on.36 The implication seems to be that when
in their allegations Lacan wrote ‘nonsense’ they limited themselves to areas where
Lacan made use of mathematical concepts, on which they are experts. But in Sokal
and Bricmont’s treatment of Lacan this is blatantly not the case. For instance, when
Lacan re-appropriates themathematical concept ‘compactness’ for his psycho-analysis
and gives a definition of compactness in the psycho-analytic sense, they argue Lacan’s
definition of “compactness is not just false: it is gibberish’‘.37 They make a similar
claim that the concept “space of jouissance in psycho-analysis” is “ill defined’‘.38 In
both cases, what most indicates their lack of expertise is their failure to provide any
justification whatsoever for why, when treating the term in a psycho-analytic context
and not a mathematical one, the concepts they criticise are “nonsense’‘. They seem to
believe the texts they quote “speak for themselves” as nonsense, but this is merely a
way of appealing to the intuitions of readers already sympathetic to Sokal and Bric-
mont’s position rather than an example of any competence with the material they cri-
ticise.39 Whenwriting about both ‘compactness’ and the ‘space of jouissance’ Sokal and
Bricmont stray into talking about the psychoanalytic, non-scientific aspects of Lacan’s
work which they readily admit they are “not competent to judge’‘.40
ii. does not apply either. It might initially seem like he was trespassing; equivoc-
ating the “erectile organ” (whatever that may be) to
√−1 does initially seem like a
fantastical claim about mathematics. Mathematics, in the sense that we usually think
of it, is a domain that Lacan as a psycho-analyst was not an expert in. But Lacan was
not actually writing about the same
√−1 as Sokal and Bricmont. Under Plotnitsky’s
interpretation of Lacan there are two types of
√−1.41 The first is (M) √−1, the math-
ematics we immediately think of, on which Sokal and Bricmont have a good level of
expertise, and on which Lacan was quiet. The second is (L)
√−1, Lacan’s very broadly
analogous mathematics, which he invented. Lacan’s “mathematics” was only strictly
mathematical in the sense that it made an analogy between psycho-analytic phenom-
ena and complex numbers.
35. Sokal & Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense, 18-37.
36. Ibid, 7.
37. Ibid, 22-3.
38. Ibid, 9.
39. Ibid, 37.
40. Ibid, 7. ‘It goes without saying that we are not competent to judge the non-scientific aspects of these
authors’ work’.
41. Plotnitsky, The Knowable and the Unknowable, 113.
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Lacan argued truths captured by psycho-analytic concepts are extremely difficult,
perhaps impossible, to visualise and conceptualise.42 Lacan compared his psycho-
analytic concepts to complex numbers; a similarly elusive phenomena which, when
we signify them, we signify not the thing itself, but an image of the thing.43 Lacan con-
structed a much more complex (L) mathematical system than this paper can outline,
but his claims always remained psycho-analytic while employing only very broadly
mathematical analogies.44 In this light, Lacan would be the foremost expert to talk
about (L) mathematics; he invented the system.
Finally, iii. does not hold. there is not a consensus among those who are experts on
Lacan that what Lacan said was deep bullshit. Therefore, 1. seems an unlikely option
in this case.
The alternative option is 2; the accuser has commiĴed epistemic trespass. The
expert in their field, as the high-profile cases usually are or else they wouldn’t have
enough social capital for anyone to listen to them, has strayed from their own domain
to talk about somethingwhich theywrongly believe they have the proficiency to speak
on.
I think that, in most cases where allegations of deep bullshit have emerged, 2. is
the most reasonable explanation. In the allegations of deep bullshit I have mentioned
above, none of i-iii apply. I think aĴention to the absence of i. in the accusers gives the
most insightful explanation of why the allegations are there. Investigating further, the
accuser initially might seem to be accusing within their own domain. For example:
• Sokal and Bricmont initially seem45 to be criticising Lacan’s interpretation of
something they are experts on; mathematics.
• Cappelen and Dever are experts on philosophy, and while they call Lacan a
“thinker” rather than a philosopher, it would be easy to think that their philo-
sophical training makes them an authority on Lacan given his influence on (con-
tinental) philosophical fields.46
• Cohen was no doubt an expert on Marxism, but his readings on French Althus-
serianism as a youth do notmake him an expert on it; he helped foundAnalytical
Marxism, an entirely different research project.
42. It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend this claim.
43. Plotnitsky “On Lacan and Mathematics’‘. 151-2.
44. Sokal and Bricmont’s complaints ‘misuse’ of mathematics in analogies are separable from their
claims about nonsense, with which this essay is concerned. They make the distinction: Sokal & Bric-
mont, Fashionable Nonsense, 4-5.
45. I am indebted to a series of lectures on paradoxes during Michaelmas 2019 by Patrick Greenough
at the University of St Andrews for the phrasing “initially seems”.
46. It is also possible that they are appealing to the authority of Sokal and Bricmont, who confirm their
bias.
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For all the above, it initially seems as if the accusers are experts in the domainwithin
which they accuse, but this is in fact not true. This lends weight to the theory that
deep bullshit accusations are often instances of epistemic trespass due to overzealous
transfer. Overzealous transfer is when agents transfer their skills to another context,
but their skills are inappropriate.47 Due to the initial seeming proximity of the fields
the accusers are experts in to the one in which they accuse, they falsely think that their
expert-domain skillswill transferwell to the accusing-domain. In Sokal andBricmont’s
case, this mistake is most obvious.
I hope that this section has successfully suggested that deep bullshit allegations
are often instances of epistemic trespass due to overzealous transfer, rather than the
truth of a conspiracy theory in French academia. Ballantyne claims that examples of
epistemic trespass allegations arewidespread, and I hope thatmy recommendations in
the following section can help prevent further trespassing deep bullshit accusations.48
6 Some Recommendations
To avoid instances of future trespassing deep bullshit allegations I make the following
three recommendations:
First, have greater epistemic modesty. Before making any allegation, ask yourself:
do I really have enough expertise to reliably make this deep bullshit allegation? Do I
have a good track record in this domain, or does it just initially seem that I do? If the
domain is outside of your own expertise, ask: do I have enough cross-field expertise
to make this allegation?49
Second, don’t use generics around instances of deep bullshit. In the same volume
as their chapter on bullshit, Cappelen and Dever have a chapter dedicated to pointing
out the dangers of generics in leading us to cognitive error.50 A generic is, roughly,
a general claim about a certain kind that is vague as to how strong it is between an
existential and universal claim e.g. ‘cats aren’t loving’ or ‘French philosophers come up
with lots of deep bullshit’.51 Despite the warnings, Cappelen and Dever are perfectly
happy to use relatively vague quantifying determiners in their claims, such as “much
of what Lacan said was bullshit”.52 This makes their claims very difficult to falsify; if
I were to give them some quotes from Lacan, they could simply say ‘oh, no I wasn’t
talking about those cases’.
47. Ballantyne, “Epistemic Trespassing’‘, 385.
48. Ibid, 369.
49. Ibid.
50. Cap.& Dev., Bad Language, 126-43.
51. The laĴer is a quote from a lecture given by Professor Cappelen duringCandlemas semester 2018 at
the University of St Andrews. It is more specific than the cats example, but still vague as to the strength
of the claim.
52. Cap.& Dev. Bad Language, 66, 71.
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To me, the third recommendation is most important of all, as the first two should
have always been fairly obvious. I believe the splits that exist within philosophy have
made the deep bullshit allegations more acceptable. In addition to the overzealous
transfer explanation, I think allegations of deep bullshit represent a chauvinistic aĴi-
tude toward other philosophical traditions. Whereas Chan mockery toward Bodhid-
harma, because he was an Indian “barbarian” who didn’t know Chinese, was playful
mockery, philosophical close-mindedness is often entirely serious.53 An example from
a lecture by Professor Cappelen should be revealing here. Cappelen divulged an an-
ecdote about a friend who studied Lacan prior to starting “real philosophy”, before
Cappelen quickly corrected himself as having “mis-spoken”.54 The French thinker con-
spiracy, like many other conspiracy theories, has emerged in large part from suspicion
toward those belonging to a different social group.
A disparaging aĴitude towards other philosophical traditions is not unique to the
analytic school. Jay Garfield, in an account of how he became interested in Buddhist
Philosophy, writes about how the late director of the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics,
Gen Lobsang Gyatso, told him western philosophy was “shallow and materialistic”
when they first met.55 Fortunately, Garfield’s teachings on Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason allowed Gyatso to notice the trespass.56 Similarly, Jacques Bouveresse, an ana-
lytic philosopher at a French university, wrote in 1983 about how fellow French philo-
sophers dismissed analytic philosophy as useless and “in the process of dying” because
it was only concerned with logic. These cases were clearly trespass, given the same in-
dividuals often thought WiĴgenstein was a logical positivist.57
The split in philosophy between analytic and continental, and between Eurocentric
and non-European, non-English speaking, and/or non-Eurocentric philosophies exists.
Strassfield’swork shows that the split between continental and analytic inAmericawas
because of a “brahmin caste” of eliteswho ensured analytic philosophy becamedomin-
ant.58 Garfield and Van Norden claim that the split between western and non-western
philosophy has emerged as a legacy of colonial euro-centrism.59 Hence, historically
speaking, neither split was as a result of the superiority of a specific methodology.
53. See §4 for this example.
54. During a lecture given by Cappelen during Candlemas semester 2018 at the University of St An-
drews.
55. Jay LGarfield Practicingwithout a License andMakingTrouble along theway: MyLife in Buddhist
Studies. (2018), 5. hĴps://jaygarfield.files.wordpress.com/2018/10/practicing-without-a-license.pdf
56. I would like to stress that Gyatso’s action is in no way comparable to the injustices which emerge
from Eurocentric philosophy departments, merely that the disparagement is commonplace.
57. Jacques Bouveresse, “Why I Am so Very UnFrench’‘, in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Alan
Montefiore (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U., 1983), 10-11, 13.
58. Jonathan Strassfeld, “American Divide: The Making Of ‘Continental’ Philosophy’‘, Modern Intel-
lectual History, 2018, 1, hĴps://doi.org/10.1017/s1479244318000513.
59. Jay LGarfield andBryanWVanNorden, “If PhilosophyWon’t Diversify, Let’s Call itWhat it Really
Is” The Stone (The New York Times, May 11, 2016), hĴps://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/opinion/if-
philosophy-wont-diversify-lets-call-it-what-it-really-is.html.
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Ballantyne calls for fieldswith potential for trespass to “rub shoulders”, but I hardly
feel that this is a sufficiently high-reaching recommendation to correct the splits in
philosophy which have led to trespass susceptibility.60
In 2020 at the University of Edinburgh I presented an early draft of this paper.61
Before the talk, someone approachedme and askedwhy Iwas presenting onBuddhism
and philosophy, which they told me were very different things. Afterward, the same
person told me kōans are poetry and not philosophy, of course without giving me
any justification whatsoever when I asked them why they thought that. This was an
instance of boundary policing; a claim that a paper is “not philosophy” rather than a
genuine engagementwhich critiques the paper’s arguments.62 Tome, it seems unlikely
that genuine engagement with the positions presented will miraculously occur if we
merely encourage philosophical shoulder rubbing between philosophers of differing
traditions. To correct this, my final recommendation is more of a demand: we need an
ambitious policy of diversification of philosophy departments’ teaching and research
interests, and a more general inclusivity of marginalised voices within philosophy.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued deep bullshit is not always a dirty, unworthy phenomenon
which we should root out of philosophy. In section 1 I quickly outlined Frankfurt’s
account of bullshit, before moving onto Cohen’s deep bullshit. I highlighted the fact
that all philosophers who have wriĴen about deep bullshit argue it is always a bad
occurrence. In section 2 I introduced kōans and I argued some kōans are deep bullshit.
However, in section 3 I argued these kōans are not a negative phenomenon which we
should root out of philosophy. In doing so I argued, contra the assumptions of Cohen
and Cappelen and Dever, deep bullshit is not always a bad occurrence. In section 4 I
responded to a potential objection from a Cohenian which claims kōans are not deep
bullshit, because they are productively suggestive. In response, I argue that because
Cohenians take Sokal’s paper as deep bullshit, they must categorise kōans as deep
bullshit too. In section 5 I moved in a different direction to argue the best explanation
for most occurrences of deep bullshit allegations are epistemic trespass, rather than
genuine occurrences of deep bullshit or charlatanry. In section 6 I made some recom-
mendations to avoid future spurious deep bullshit allegations. The most important
recommendation argues that we need an ambitious project to transform philosophy
60. Ballantyne “Epistemic Trespassing’‘, 388.
61. I had a great evening and my thanks go to the University of Edinburgh Philosophy and Buddhist
societies for hosting me. I give this example because it is relevant, not because it represents my experi-
ence of the whole of the evening.
62. For a seminal paper on this phenomenon: Kristie Dotson, “How Is This Paper Philosophy?’‘, Com-
parative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches to-
ward World Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2012), hĴps://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2012).030105.
Meaning in Gibberish: In Defence of Deep Bullshit 45
departments so that trespassing deep bullshit allegations can no longer occur.63
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